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Abstract
In this paper we present the new logic programming language DALI,
aimed at defining agents and agent systems. A main design objective for
DALI has been that of introducing in a declarative fashion all the essential
features, while keeping the language as close as possible to the syntax and
semantics of the plain Horn–clause language. Special atoms and rules have
been introduced, for representing: external events, to which the agent is able
to respond (reactivity); actions (reactivity and proactivity); internal events
(previous conclusions which can trigger further activity); past and present
events (to be aware of what has happened). An extended resolution is pro-
vided, so that a DALI agent is able to answer queries like in the plain Horn–
clause language, but is also able to cope with the different kinds of events,
and exhibit a (rational) reactive and proactive behaviour.
1 Introduction
In this paper we address the issue of defining a logic programming language for
reactive and proactive agent systems, with a clear procedural and declarative se-
mantics. The motivation of this paper is that, while it is quite straightforward to
build logical agents which are in some way rational, it is much more difficult to
build logical agents that interact with the environment, and perform actions either
on their own initiative (i.e. they are proactive) or in response to events which occur
externally (i.e. they are reactive).
A lot of work has been done in order to equip logical agents with more and
more sophisticated forms of rationality. Logical agents can represent (and com-
municate) their own as well as other agents’ thinking processes, and are able to
build arguments by means of their own inference rules where: either each agent
1Note of the author: This paper was presented at the 2nd International Work-
shop on Component-based Software Development in Computational Logic (COCL
1999), and appeared in the online Proceedings (A. Brogi and P.M. Hill eds.,
http://www.di.unipi.it/
˜
brogi/ResearchActivity/COCL99/proceedings/index.html).
In this paper, the Agent-Oriented logic programming language DALI [5, 6] was first introduced.
has a logic associated with it, [14], [18], with rules of inference which relate the
different logics of the different agents; or, each agent is defined together with its
specific inference rules and communication modalities [3].
Logical agents are able to combine belief updating, goal updating and practical
reasoning in a BDI fashion (“Belief, Desires, Intentionality”) [20], [19]. Logical
agents are able to interact with an environment on which they have limited [22] or
no [1] expertise. Logical agents can reason about actions ([11] and subsequent ex-
tensions) and can manipulate not simply logical formulas, but complex data types,
and are able to act in accordance with a specific, declarative policy [10]. Many of
these approaches are related to logic programming, either syntactically or semanti-
cally, others are based on theorem–proving or transition systems as an operational
semantics.
Reactive and proactive agents typically achieve their functionality by means
of condition–action rules, where the condition constitutes a stimulus that causes
the agent to perform some kind of action as response. The approach of [15] is
aimed at combining rationality and reactivity in logic: it proposes that reactivity
is achieved, in a rational agent, by modeling reactive rules as integrity constraints
in the proof procedure. By combining the approaches of [15] and [3], the ap-
proach of [8] obtains rational reactive agents by treating communication primitives
as abducibles. There are, however, few approaches in logic programming for rep-
resenting not only the actual behavior of one agent in a detailed way, but also the
behavior of complex multi–agent systems, with few notable exceptions. A rele-
vant approach is the concurrent logic programming language ConGolog [16], [21],
based on situation calculus, where properties of multi–agent systems can be for-
mally proved. At present, ConGolog has been less useful as an implementation
language, although further developments are under way. Another one is the Con-
straint Logic Programming language CaseLP, which can also be used in the context
of a Multi-Agent-System specification methodology based on linear logic [2], [7].
In this paper we focus on representing reactivity and proactivity in logic pro-
gramming in the simplest possible way, with the objective of introducing in a
declarative fashion all the essential features, while keeping the language as close as
possible to the syntax and semantics of logic programming [17]. The resulting lan-
guage (that we call DALI) should then be easy to understand, easy to implement,
and easy to use. To this aim, we introduce:
distinct atoms to represent external events; whenever an event takes place (it can
be an action or a message from another agent, or something which changes
in the external world), the corresponding event atom becomes true;
distinct atoms to represent internal events; an internal event corresponds to a con-
clusion reached by the agent, which can trigger some kind of activity in the
agent itself;
distinct atoms to reason about past events, and present events, the latter being
events which have already taken place, to which the agent has however not
yet responded;
distinct atoms to represent actions that can be performed by the agent;
reactive rules that have an event (either external or internal) as conclusion; a
reactive rule can be understood as the agent’s reaction to the event;
action rules that have an action as conclusion; an action rule can be understood
as defining the preconditions for an action to be performed;
active rules that have actions in their body, so as to model proactive behavior,
where an agent performs an action with the aim of reaching some kind of
objective, and reactive behavior where an agent acts in response to stimuli,
since a reactive rule can be active.
Procedural semantics is based on an easy–to–implement, extended resolution.
Declarative semantics of agents and agent systems is based on “snapshots” of the
current stage of the computation, which consist in the Least Herbrand Models on
a suitably modified versions of the logic programs representing agents. Snapshots
can then be organized so as to represent “evolutions” of the agent system.
In order to keep the discussion as simple as possible, we take as basic language
the plain propositional Horn-clause language, and we just consider “events” and
“actions” without even trying any finer distinction. We are conscious of the fact
that, when introducing variables and time, there will be many related issues to be
coped with. Also for lack of space, we leave these topics out of the scope of the
present paper. In perspective, however, the practical logic language DALI will have
all the useful features of real languages, though still remaining (in our opinion) as
simple and clean as to be easily integrated, if needed, with most of the previously
mentioned approaches.
2 Reactive Logic Programming
2.1 External Events
In order to illustrate the extension we propose to the Horn–clause language, it is
useful to take into consideration about how rules are understood in logic program-
ming. Consider for instance the following logic program:
p.
p :- r, s
The second rule is by no means necessary to prove the truth of p, that is an imme-
diate consequence of the first rule (which is a fact). In this case, clearly truth of p
is not conditioned by truth of r, s. It is important to notice however that the second
rule is still a candidate for resolution of goal ? − p, and it will be finally selected
by any fair interpreter, and will be applied by the immediate consequence opera-
tor TP . Then, since we already know that p is true, we can interpret the resolvent
?− r, s as a reaction of the interpreter in response to the stimulus ?− p.
Let us now assume that p is an external event, i.e. something which occur out-
side (and independently of) the program that we are considering. External events,
or stimuli, could be messages, or actions (performed by some other entity) which
affect the agent, or observations, depending of the environment where the program
is put at work. At present, we do not distinguish between these cases.
Similarly to most logical approaches to agents, we leave to the language de-
veloper to decide how the agents are made conscious that an event took place, and
how to suitably represent an event to a given agent (for instance, if you call me on
the phone, I see this action the other way round, i.e. in my view I am being called).
We simply assume that, as soon as this event happens, p somehow assumes
value true for every agent Ag which is able to observe this event. Then, any rule
defining p in the program of agent Ag, can be interpreted as a stimulus–response
rule, i.e. a rule that determines some actions to be executed in response to the
stimulus p.
Enhancing logic programs with some kind of modules of agents (or, more gen-
erally, of multiple theories) is a well studied topic. Following [3], we assume we
have a form of modularization available, that allows a program to be divided into
separate modules, or agents, each one endowed with its own name (this without
affecting the standard semantics). In the following, when referring to agent Ag, we
will implicitly refer to the logic program defining Ag.
Then, we associate to Ag a set of distinct atoms
EAg = {E1, . . . , Es}, s ≥ 0
representing external events. We call each of the Ej’s an event atom. According to
[3], whenever event Ej takes place, atom Ej becomes true for all the other agents.
We assume that events which have taken place are recorded in a set EV ⊆ EAg
For each Ej , Ag may possibly provide only one rule of the form:
Ej:-Rj,1, . . . , Rj,q. q ≥ 1
where the Rj,i’s can be understood as responses to the stimulus Ej .
We call this rule a reactive rule. Notice that having a single reactive rule for
each event is not really a restriction, since the Rj,i’s may have multiple definitions.
We assume that events are ”consumed” by reactive rules. I.e., the application
of the reactive rule causes Ej to be removed from EV
We state the limitation that the Ej’s do not appear in the body of other rules.
Then, when Ej happens, we are in a situation fairly analogous to that of the above
example, since we have a true atom, and a rule which is by no means aimed at
proving this fact, but that, instead, specifies activities (internal inferences and/or
actions) to undertake as response. Then, atoms in the body should not be intended
as determining the truth of Ej , but, vice versa, as predicates that should be proved
whenever Ej becomes true. In a sense, it is like if the opposite side of the impli-
cation is being used. However, notice that we do not say that truth of Ej implies
truth of Rj,1, . . . , Rj,q, but that on truth of Ej , truth of Rj,1, . . . , Rj,q should be
checked.
To make this interpretation more intuitive, and in order to make it recognizable
that rules with conclusion Ej are stimulus–response rules, a slightly different no-
tation may be used, for instance by replacing the token “:-” with “:>”, Then the
syntax of a reactive rule becomes:
Ej :>Rj,1, . . . , Rj,q. q ≥ 1
For the sake of readability, given predicate p, the fact that p ∈ EAg, i.e. that p
represents an external event, is stressed by an explicit subscript, by denoting p as
pE .
Example 2.1 If an event determines some behavior, then stimulus–response rules
are adequate, like for instance
Ag
rainsE :> open umbrella.
open umbrella :- have umbrella.
where rains ∈ EAg. The rule says that in case it rains, the agent opens an um-
brella. Then, on truth of event rains, we check the truth of (i.e. try to prove) the
related condition open umbrella. This is done as usual in logic programming, i.e.
using the second rule, and try proving its condition have umbrella.
Notice that, if there are several atoms in the conditions of a reactive rule, their
order may be relevant.
Example 2.2 Consider the following variation of previous example.
Ag
rainsE :> open umbrella, decide what to do.
In this case, it is better to open the umbrella before deciding what to do next (which
for instance could be going home, or instead entering a shop).
2.2 Actions
Since Ag is reactive and proactive, we also associate to Ag the set of distinct atoms
AAg = {A1, . . . , Aq}, q ≥ 0
which represents the actions that Ag is able to perform. We call each of the Aj’s
an action atom.
Actions can be performed in response to external events, but also on the agent’s
own initiative (proactivity). The Ai’s can appear in the body of rules, and may have
an explicit definition, i.e. there can be (optionally) only one rule with head Ai, that
we call action rule. In this case, the body of this rule expresses preconditions for
the action to be performed. Action rules are the same as ordinary rules, and in fact
are treated by DALI resolution in exactly the same way. However, in order to make
it visible that, conceptually, action rules express preconditions for actions, we add
again some syntactic sugar so as to distinguish action rules from the others. An
action rule will have in particular the form
Ai:<Ci,1, . . . , Ci,s s ≥ 1
It is left to the implementation that, whenever Ai succeeds, on the one hand atom
Ai becomes true (as an external event) to all the other agents (according to [3]),
and, on the other hand, the corresponding action is performed in practice, in case
Ag actually interacts with an environment. If there are several rules with the same
action in their body, then this action can be potentially performed several times.
Given predicate p, the fact that p ∈ AAg , i.e. that p represents an action, is
stressed by an explicit subscript, by denoting p as pA.
Example 2.3
Ag
dangerE :> ask for help.
ask for help :- call policeA.
ask for help :- screamA.
call policeA :< have a phone.
In this case, we have the external event danger∈ EAg, to which the agent reacts
with ask for help (which is an ordinary predicate). This implies possibly perform-
ing one or both of the two actions screamA or call policeA where screamA ∈ AAg,
call policeA ∈ AAg. The latter one however can be performed upon precondition
have a phone, as specified by the corresponding action rule.
Notice that it is somewhat arbitrary to decide which are the predicates that are
to be inserted into the set AAg of actions. In principle, the distinction between
actions and ordinary predicates is that actions affect the environment, and/or are
observable from the other agents.
From the declarative point of view, action subgoals without a corresponding
action rule always succeed, while action subgoals with an action rule succeed or
fail (in which case the action is not performed) according to the standard procedural
semantics of the Horn clause language. In practice however, an action may be
unsuccessful in the sense that, for some reason, it is not possible to achieve the
intended effect on the external environment. For instance, referring to the above
example, the action call policeA might in practice be prevented by the phone being
out of order. In some cases, the agent itself might cope with this kind of failures,
by following some protocol in the interaction with other agents. In other cases,
the implementation should make the agent aware of the failure of an action. A
possibility is that of specially generated external events: in this way the agent
might provide, whenever necessary, suitable ”recovery” event rules.
2.3 Internal Events: Reacting to Conclusions
Assume that, whenever some conclusion is reached, this triggers some kind of
activity (internal reaction) in the agent. This is possible by defining another set of
distinct atoms, IAg, which contains those predicates which are to be considered as
events, and then can possibly appear as the conclusion of only one reactive rule.
This kind of predicates will be called internal events. From the procedural
point of view, we assume the conclusion happy, obtained by means of the ordinary
rule, is recorded in a set IV ⊆ IAg, and then reconsidered later to trigger the re-
active rule. Similarly to external events, the internal events which are ”consumed”
by reactive rules, are removed from IV .
Given predicate p, the fact that p ∈ IAg, i.e. that p represents an internal event,
is stressed by an explicit subscript, by denoting p as pIE.
Example 2.4 Assume that we want to express the fact that Henry, when happy,
merrily sings a song. Then, Henry’s theory might become:
Henry
happy :- sunny day.
happyIE :> sing a song.
where sing a song ∈ AHenry. For defining the reactive rule, we let happy ∈
IHenry, i.e. we state that the internal conclusion happy may be interpreted as an
event, and determine an action.
Internal events can play an important role whenever the agent makes some
kind of planning for achieving its goals. In fact, by means of reactive rules related
to internal events, plans can be “tuned” according to the subgoals that have been
actually achieved.
Also, internal events may help simulate a sort of ”consciousness” in the agent,
which is able to recognize, reason about and react to its own conclusions. To this
aim, subgoals corresponding to predicates belonging to IAg should be automati-
cally attempted from time to time. Referring to the above example, the subgoal
happy should be attempted every now and then, so as to apply the reactive rule
in case of success. Which ones to attempt, and how frequently, can be left to the
implementation, possibly guided by suitable directives.
An action atom may be considered as an internal event, and therefore the agent
can “react” to its own actions.
Example 2.5 Assume now that Anne is invited by her friends to go out with them.
She checks for the possibility of going by car, and if the car is not available, then
she takes the bus. If she take the car, she calls on her friend Susan in order to ask
her to join. This is represented by the following rules.
Anne
invitationE :> go out.
go out :- go by carA.
go out :- take the busA.
go by carA :< car available.
go by carIE :> ask susan to join.
2.4 Drawing Conclusion from Past Events
It may be useful to allow event atoms in the body of rules. In fact, it may be the
case that there is a conclusion to draw, depending on what has happened before.
Then, we suppose that external and internal events are recorded. In particular,
for every event atom E ∈ EAg ∪ IAg, we add another distinct atom EP (where P
stands for past), meaning that event E has happened in the past. We call EPAg the
set of these atoms.
Example 2.6 For instance, if we want to express that George is happy if his girl-
friend has called, then we need a rule such as:
George
happy :- girlfriend callP .
where girlfriend call ∈ EHenry.
Notice that this is a source of nonmonotonicity in the observable behavior of
the agent. In fact, query ?-happy to agent Henry may initially fail, and may later
succeed when the event girlfriend call will have happened. In our interpretation,
an event becomes a past event whenever the agent has reacted to it, i.e. as soon as
the corresponding reactive rule has been applied.
We do not mean past events ad an ”ad hoc” way of handling time. Rather, we
see the set of past events as a sort of “state” of the agent, although it is important
to notice that the facts that are recorded are either external events which have hap-
pened, or conclusions that have been proved, or actions that have been performed.
The set of past events constitutes a repository for lemmas, and therefore is no harm
from the declarative point of view. From the practical point of view, it is a sort of
”memory”, useful to the agent to enforce a coherence in its interactions with the
external environment. Notice however that the set of past events is by no means
similar to the memory of imperative languages, where one can record arbitrary
statements.
2.5 Drawing Conclusion from Present Events
It can also be useful to reason about an external event which ”has already taken
place”, and to which the agent has not yet reacted. I.e., we would like atoms to be
allowed into the body of rules, which correspond to events that are already available
to the agent, although the corresponding reactive rule has not been applied yet.
This because we want to distinguish between reasoning about events, and reacting
to events.
In particular, for every event atom E we add another distinct atom EN (where
N stands for now), meaning that event E has happened but has not been considered
yet. We call ENAg the set of these atoms.
Example 2.7 In this example Mary is awakened by the alarm clock. Then, she
realizes it is time to stand up, and also switches the alarm clock off.
Mary
my god its late :- alarm clock ringsN .
my god its lateIE :> stand up.
alarm clock ringsE :> switch it off.
In this case, alarm clock rings is an external event, while my god its late is an
agent’s conclusion, which is interpreted as an internal event. Notice that the
ring of the alarm clock is first reasoned about, by means of the special predicate
alarm clock ringsN , which allows a conclusion to be reached, and then gives rise
to a reaction. Precisely, alarm clock rings ∈ EMary , my god its late ∈ IMary,
switch it off ∈ AMary , and alarm clock ringsN ∈ ENMary
Present events may help reasoning about the effects of actions.
3 Procedural Semantics
What we need for building a DALI interpreter is the possibility of monitoring ex-
ternal and internal events, so as to actually respond to stimuli. We propose to do
that by means of an extension to SLD–resolution.
We assume to associate the following sets to the goal which is being processed
by a DALI interpreter:
• the set EV ⊆ EAg of the external events that are available to the agent
(stimuli to which the agent can possibly respond);
• the set IV ⊆ IAg of internal events which have been proved up to now
(internal stimuli to which the agent can possibly respond);
• the set PV ⊆ EPAg of past events (both internal and external).
The procedural behaviour of a DALI agent may consist of the following activ-
ities. First, trying to answer a query (like in plain Horn–clause language). Second,
responding to either external or internal events. Third, trying to prove a goal corre-
sponding to an internal event (as suggested before, these goals should be attempted
from time to time). These different kinds of activities are in principle independent
of each other, and should be somehow interleaved: for instance, while trying to
answer a query, an external or internal event may occur, to which the agent should
in the meanwhile respond.
Therefore, a goal in DALI is a disjunction G1;G2; . . . ;Gn of component goals.
Every Gk, k ≤ n is a goal as usually defined in the Horn–clause language, i.e. a
conjunction. The meaning is that the computation fails only if all disjuncts fail.
The suggested strategy for proving a goal is the interleaving, i.e. the interpreter
at each step should be able to pick up a subgoal from any of the Gk’s, or to add
a new Gj , that in particular will be an external or internal event. The resolution
strategy adopted in a DALI implementation will specify how to perform the inter-
leaving among the component goals. The precise definition of a resolution strategy
is however out of the scope of this paper. Instead, we concentrate in defining which
are the resolution steps that the interpreter can perform.
In fact, below is the formal definition of the extended resolution. Notice that
a resolution step will also update (whenever necessry) the sets EV , IV and PV .
The definition is composed of six different cases. In cases (i)-(iii) the selected atom
belongs to one of the existing component goals. In cases (iv)-(vi) instead, an atom
is chosen from the set of external (resp. internal) events, and is added to the given
goal, as a new component goal. At each stage of the inference process, more than
one case will be in general applicable. The resolution strategy will state in which
order the different cases should be applied, and how often to consider the different
classes of events.
Definition 3.1 (DALI Resolution) Given a logic program defining agent Ag (with
associated sets of external events EAg, internal events IAg, actions AAg, past
events EPAg, present events ENAg), given sets EV ⊆ EAg, IV ⊆ IAg and
PV ⊆ EPAg, and goal G of the form
G1; . . . ;Gn
where each Gk, k ≤ n is of the form:
?−Qk1, . . . , Q
k
m.
DALI resolution derives a new goal G′ and new sets EV ′, IV ′ and PV ′ by means
of one of the following steps.
(i) Select atom Qki ∈ Gk and a corresponding defining clause C , and apply
SLD–resolution with Qki as the selected atom and C as the input clause,
thus obtaining G′. Let EV ′ = IV , IV ′ = IV and PV ′ = PV .
(ii) Select atom Qki ∈ Gk where Qki ∈ AAg, without defining clauses, and
derive the new goal G′ where the component goal Gk is replaced by
?−Qk1, . . . , Q
k
i−1, Q
k
i+1, . . . , Q
k
m.
Let EV ′ = EV , PV ′ = PV and if Qki ∈ IAg then IV ′ = IV ∪ {Qki},
else IV ′ = IV .
(iii) Select atom Qki ∈ ENAg ∩ EV , and derive the new goal G′ where the
component goal Gk is replaced by
?−Qk1, . . . , Q
k
i−1, Q
k
i+1, . . . , Q
k
m.
Let EV ′ = EV , IV ′ = IV and PV ′ = PV .
(iv) Choose atom Ej ∈ EV , and join it to the given goal, thus deriving the new
goal G′ with the new component goal Gn+1 = Ej Let EV ′ = EV \ {Ej},
IV ′ = IV and PV ′ = PV ∪ {Ej}.
(v) Choose atom Ij ∈ IV , and join it to the given goal, thus deriving the new
goal G′ with the new component goal Gn+1 = Ij Let EV ′ = EV , IV ′ =
IV \ {Ij} and PV ′ = PV ∪ {Ij}.
(vi) Choose atom A ∈ IAg, and join it to the given goal, thus deriving the new
goal G′ with the new component goal Gn+1 = A.
Given a goal G, according to the above definition, DALI resolution can do one
of the following.
(i) Pick up a subgoal from any component goal Gk, and proceed with the refuta-
tion as usual. This case is also adequate if the subgoal is an action atom with
a defining clause, or an event atom with a corresponding reactive clause.
(ii) Perform an action without preconditions, which means select an action atom
without a defining clause, and just remove it from the goal. I.e., an action
without preconditions always “succeeds”. It is left to the implementation
perform the action, and to make the action atom true (in the form of an
external event) to all the other agents. If this action is among the internal
events, then it must be included into the set IV since it has taken place, and
then it can possibly trigger some internal reaction.
(iii) Consider an atom EN corresponding to an event E ∈ EV , i.e corresponding
to an external event which has happened, but that has not been considered
yet. This atom can simply be removed from the goal, i.e. “succeeds”, while
EV remains unchanged, since the agent has still to react to E. Intuitively,
the agent asks itself whether E has happened, so as to use this knowledge in
its reasoning. Later, it will possibly react to E.
(iv)–(v) React to any of the external or internal events, by inserting the corre-
sponding new component goal in the overall goal. The event has to be re-
moved from the set of the events which are still to be considered, and inserted
into the set of past events.
(vi) Insert a new component goal which corresponds to an internal event. In this
way, in case this component goal succeeds, it becomes possible to ”react” to
this conclusion (intuitively, the agent asks itself whether A holds, so as to act
consequently if this is the case).
It is left to the resolution strategy which case to apply at each step (if there are
several possibilities). I.e., it is left to the resolution strategy to choose how often to
consider external and internal events, and in which order, and how to organize the
interleaving among the component goals.
What is not considered in the previous definition is the fact that, whenever a
subgoal corresponding to an internal event is proved, it should be inserted into the
set IV . This is for the sake of simplicity, but notice that the definition can be
made precise by introducing nested refutation for these atoms. A nested subgoal
is a subgoal of the form (A)A. When resolving A, it would become (B1, . . . Bn)A
and so on. Any subgoal corresponding to an internal event should be a nested
subgoal. On obtaining the empty nested subgoal ()A, i.e. on proving A, we would
let IV ′ = IV ∪ {A}.
Notice that EV represents some kind of input channel for the agent. As a fur-
ther extension, we could have several “channels”, according to some classification
of different events (e.g. messages or observations or other interactions with the
external environment). Also, the resolution strategy could take as input some kind
of declaration about the priority for selecting among different possibilities.
4 Declarative Semantics
Work is under way for a complete definition of declarative semantics, able to con-
sider in general terms the evolutions of multi–agent systems. At present, we are
able to specify the declarative semantics of an agent given a certain initial situation,
i.e., in a sense, a “snapshot” of the agent’s behavior. We are also able to sketch how
to describe the evolution of a set of interacting agents, but we have only an initial
idea on how to study properties of the system as a whole.
In the following, we first specify semantics of a single agent, and then introduce
a concept of evolution of an agent system.
The first objective is to declaratively model reactive rules for external and in-
ternal events. Consider for a moment the plain Horn–clause language, and the
following program:
p.
p :- q.
q.
Its least Herbrand model is {q, p}, like for the following slightly modified version:
p.
p :- p, q.
q.
Since p is true by means of a unit clause, the second rule for p does not change
the meaning of the program, since it differs from the previous version only in that
there is p itself in the body.
This is exactly the trick that we will use for our reactive Horn–clause programs.
Precisely, given (external or internal) event E, we assume to transform rule:
E:>R1, . . . , Rq.
into the new rule:
E:-E,R1, . . . , Rq.
Syntactically, we have added E itself in the body of its own rule. The meaning is
that, since there is no other rule in Ag defining E, then the conditions of this rule
may become true only if the truth of E comes from some other agent, i.e. if event
E has happened. We also add rule
EP :-E,R1, . . . , Rq.
which models the fact that as soon as the reactive rule for E is applied, a corre-
sponding past event EP is generated.
The second objective is to declaratively model actions, without or with an ac-
tion clause. The point is, an action atom should become true (given its precon-
ditions, if any) whenever the action is actually performed in some rule. Consider
another simple program written in the plain Horn–clause language:
p.
p :- b, a.
b.
Its least Herbrand model is {p, b}, since both p and b are given as facts. If we
modify the program as follows:
p.
p :- b, a.
b.
a :- p, b.
its least model is {p, b, a}. Assuming that p is an event atom and a is an action atom
with no defining clause, this modification ensures that the action atom a becomes
true whenever the action is actually performed, i.e. if the clause defining p is
applied, and its condition b is true. Similarly, let us assume that a has a defining
clause, like in the program:
p.
p :- b, a.
b.
a :- c.
c.
Its least Herbrand model is {p, b, a}, since p, b and c are given as facts. We modify
the program as follows:
p.
p :- b, a.
b.
a :- c, p, b.
Its least model is still {p, b, a}, but, interpreting a as an action atom, we state then
a can be derived only if the corresponding action is actually performed in the rule
defining p. More generally, for every action A, with action rule
A:<C1, . . . , Cs. s ≥ 1
and for every other clause where A appears in the conditions, of the form
B:-D1, . . . ,Dh, A1, . . . , As. h ≥ 1, s ≥ 1
with A ∈ {A1, . . . , As}, we assume to add the new rule
A:-B,D1, . . . ,Dh, C1, . . . , Cs.
If A has no defining clause, we instead add clause:
A:-B,D1, . . . ,Dh.
The meaning is that A is been performed (if its preconditions C1, . . . , Cs hold) by
the clause with head B , provided that the conditions D1, . . . ,Dh in the body of
this clause are true.
Finally, for every external or internal or past event E that we want to be true at
the beginning, we add corresponding unit clauses
E.
EN .
We define the “snapshot” declarative semantics of a program P written in our
enhanced Horn–clause language DALI, as the standard declarative semantics of
a program P ′, obtained from P by means of the modifications specified above.
Work is under way for proving DALI resolution correct and complete w.r.t. this
declarative semantics, by means of an adaptation of standard proofs.
It is important to notice that we have defined the semantics of our new language
by modifying the program, while leaving the semantic approach unchanged. In
this way, we keep all the useful properties of the Horn–clause language, thus we
are still able to exploit all the technical machinery related to it (such as methods
for program analysis and optimization, abstract interpretation, partial evaluation,
debugging, etc.) which remains applicable on P ′.
If we want to be more precise in our “snapshot” of the behavior of agent P ,
we can simulate a resolution strategy R by taking a program P ′(R) ⊆ P ′, where
P ′(R) differs form P ′ in that only the clauses that R should select are left, while
the others are cancelled. Of course however, several P ′(R) can be obtained from
P ′.
We can extend this semantic approach by defining the following procedure for
modeling evolutions of a multi–agent system:
1. Given n logic programs (agents) P1, . . . , Pn, build P1′, . . . , Pn′.
2. Given computation rule R , from P1′, . . . , Pn′, build P1′(R), . . . , Pn′(R).
3. Compute the least Herbrand models of P1′(R), . . . , Pn′(R), say
M1, . . . ,Mn.
4. Taken as starting point the set of events contained in M1, . . . ,Mn, change
the unit clauses of P1′(R), . . . , Pn′(R) accordingly, and go back to step 3.
In this way, we obtain possible evolutions of our agent system. In order to study
these evolutions, we can for instance pick up the suggestion by [13], of adopting
well–established techniques from the field of model–checking.
5 Concluding Remarks
An agent as defined above, is completely characterized by its input channels, res-
olution strategy and Horn–clause theory. About the input channels, of course we
recognize the need, as emphasized by [12], of an underlying “transducer” inte-
grated in the implementation, that converts all the incoming “stimuli” into a form
that is intelligible to the agent and inserts them into the right channel.
A lot of implementation issues have been left open in this paper. An important
point is that of timely response to events, possibly guided by directives specifying
time constraints. These constraints should influence the resolution strategy. It is not
clear however how one could prove that a DALI program satisfies given real–time
requirements.
Metareasoning is important for agents: as remarked in [2], an agent can rea-
son on the basis of meta–goals, which possibly require sophisticated strategies to
be achieved. Then, it would be interesting to take as basis for DALI an enhanced
Horn–clause language with self–reference and reflection like Reflective Prolog ([4]
which is the basic language for [3] and [8]). On the lines of [9] and [3], met-
alevel information could also be used to construct agent interfaces, and to record
information about heterogeneous information sources, in view of the integration of
heterogeneous information systems.
It is important to notice that we have not considered negation. Negation is
instead really important from the expressive and practical point of view, at least
since it allows exceptions to be stated to general reactive rules. In the following
example, where we assume to have negation as failure, we define a situation where
birds can fly for trying to avoid a predator (while the other animals run away),
except for abnormal birds, like penguins or road–runners.
Example 5.1
Animal
predator AttacksE :> try to Escape.
try to Escape :- flyA.
try to Escape :- runA.
flyA :< bird, not abnormal.
Negation adds further complication to both declarative and procedural seman-
tics. Nevertheless, adding negation to DALI is a main topic of future research.
Since this is work in progress, a suitable comparison with related work is miss-
ing. We mean to add the comparison in the final version of the paper.
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